who his Justices were likely to be -even though the implicit suggestion in his "I don't want to tip my hand" statement is that he and his advisers already have a set of names for the Court that they are thinking about. There may have been personal benefits to Obama from not tipping his hand -he could keep a variety of his supporters working hard on his campaign in the hope of being chosen as nominees. But the benefits to society of candidates being forced to show their cards prior to the election may be greater still.
It is trite to say that the current system of presidential nominations is flawed. The question is how to make it better. For those of us who have no direct power to effectuate change, the solution has to be one that can be achieved without the need for resources, votes, lobbyists, and the like. The idea will strike many as nutty. But asking candidates to name names may yield real answers, and the process of asking and answering may produce change. 4 Our hope is to induce competition between the presidential candidates over who would pick the better nominees. There are barriers to inducing this competition. But they might be surmountable when one candidate is significantly behind in the polls and is willing to take some risks. The key is to consider how pre-election choices might differ from what we would expect from that same President once elected. For instance, we might move from the current state in which Supreme Court nominees are almost all youngish sitting federal appeals court judges who have little in the way of a controversial publications record to a model of older and more interesting non-judges.
Perhaps the most specific he has been was during one of the debates where, in response to a question about the kinds of people he would appoint to the Court, he said that he would seek "people who have life experience and they understand what it means to be on the outside, what it means to have the system not work for them". The Democratic Debate, Nov. 15, 2007 , N.Y. TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/us/politics/15debate-transcript.html?pagewanted=40&_r=2. Barack and His Shadow Cabinet: Should He Appoint A Shadow Cabinet Now?, May 29, 2008 , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyce/barack-and-his-shadow-sho_b_104035. html. Part of the reason for the lack of more discussion may be the belief that such an announcement would be illegal. As we discuss below, there is indeed a federal statute that could be read to prohibit such an announcement, but such an application would clearly violate the First Amendment. See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text.
I. The Status Quo and Its Drawbacks

A. The Norm
Presidential candidates choose and announce their choice for Vice President in advance, and usually perceive the choice as one that can help them in the election. But the tradition is not to name anyone else. In contrast, Britain has a tradition of "shadow governments," in which the party out of power has an entire cabinet of alternative (or "shadow") ministers who are generally expected to take on those same roles if their party comes to power. 5 Voters thus have a sense not only of the Prime Minister they are potentially electing, but also of the ministers who will serve in the cabinet.
Candidates sometimes say that they would select Justices "like" certain sitting Justices. George W. Bush promised to select Justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, and John McCain said that John Roberts and Samuel Alito "would serve as the model for my own nominees."
6 Meanwhile, candidates sometimes give hints about whom they would consider for cabinet positions. For example, it was apparently widely believed that Thomas Dewey was going to choose John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State in 1948. 7 But presidential candidates have not publicly promised that they will choose X, Y, or Z. 
B. Problems with the Status Quo
Only after they are elected do Presidents identify their cabinet choices and (with luck) eventually a few Supreme Court nominees. The President's incentives at this stage are not to win votes -he already did that.
9 Now, they are a combination of wanting to perpetuate his legacy well 5 E.g., RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT 171-81 (1999 A newly elected President likely hopes to be re-elected, but he would also know that re-election was sufficiently far away that his initial choice of cabinet and Supreme Court nominees would have a fairly attenuated effect on the election four years hence. beyond his time, to pay back political favors from the election, and to protect against the Senate undermining his nominee. A President's choices often give rise to complaints involving surprise and the qualifications of nominees. As to the former, critics might say that the President is not nominating the sort of people whom he indicated he would nominate when he was a candidate. As to the latter, the complaints involving cabinet members might focus on the perceived inexperience of some nominees. Relatedly, there is often suspicion that these nominations are payback, a form of patronage. The complaints involving Supreme Court Justices often involve their ideology as well as their youth, since Presidents have an incentive to nominate relative youngsters to the bench in the hope that they will have long careers and thus extend presidential legacies.
Supreme Court Nominees
Before the election, the presidential candidates will care primarily about winning. Pre-election, the matter of creating a legacy will be a back burner issue, if one at all. After the election, legacy creation moves to the front burner. Presidents have an interest in nominating Justices who are as young as possible. This flows from a particular exception: the United States is one of the only nations that has neither a retirement age nor a term limit for the members of its highest court.
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So a President seeking to maximize the impact of his appointments (and why shouldn't he?) has an interest in appointing Justices who have many years to live. Unsurprisingly, in light of this incentive, most recent Supreme Court nominees have been 55 or younger, and Clarence Thomas was 43.
11 On the flip side, judges in their 60s like J. Harvie Wilkinson or Richard Posner are thought to be too old to have a chance of being appointed to the Court -and it is clearly not because of any diminishment in their judging intellect. Most experts would likely say that a person with a longer career and the varied experiences that go along with it would be a preferable choice for a Justice -that such a person would exercise better judgment. Eight of the nine Justices on the current Supreme Court were 55 or younger when nominated (Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the exception). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States. entrenchment that young appointments can entail, delaying for years the impact of changes in the popular will.
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A different complaint is more specific to recent Supreme Court nomination trends: the absence of political experience among its members. This is probably the starkest discontinuity between the current Supreme Court and its predecessors. With the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court has zero members who have ever served in a legislature or run for election from any electorate bigger than her high-school class. 13 The Court has but two members who served as high-level members of the Executive Branch, and neither was in the cabinet or was otherwise a significant political figure. 14 Scholars have noted the break with historical practice. Through much of its history, the Court had several members who were important political figures in their own right before they joined the CourtSenators (e.g., Hugo Black), governors (e.g., Earl Warren), presidential candidates or Presidents (e.g., William Howard Taft), members of the President's cabinet (e.g., Robert Jackson), or all of the above (e.g., Salmon Chase, who was a Senator, governor, presidential candidate, and cabinet member before he became Chief Justice).
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Many note this development with chagrin. They argue that the country would be better served by a Supreme Court with some members who have had significant political experience. 16 The cases before the Supreme Court often involve issues where knowledge of the political process would be helpful -e.g., cases where the exigencies of legislative or executive decisionmaking loom large. Also, some have argued that serving on the Supreme Court involves more than judging -that it is in part a policy-making position and that the experiences entailed in running for Our point is not to endorse this critique, but to note that it, like many academic critiques, identifies a problem on which we, the public, currently have no impact. The President nominates and the Senate confirms. It is possible for a group of citizens to lobby the President to choose a particular Supreme Court nominee or lobby the Senate not to confirm a nominee who lacks significant political experience. But it is hard to imagine any of the special interests that are capable of the necessary lobbying, doing anything about this concern. Their interests probably go in the reverse direction. The trend toward nominating Supreme Court Justices with little political experience has probably corresponded with a rise in the lobbying of Presidents and Senators. 
Cabinet Nominations
There is less commonality in the criticisms of the cabinetnomination process, but the two most common involve partisanship and qualifications. George W. Bush's first cabinet provides an example. His campaign for the Presidency emphasized that he was a moderate governor who often reached across the aisle and worked closely with Democrats.
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When he was elected President in the closest presidential election in American history, many expected that he would fill his cabinet with moderate cabinet members and a fair number of Democrats. Instead, there was but one Democrat -the moderate to conservative Norman Mineta (and Mineta's position, Secretary of Transportation, has traditionally been considered one of the least important cabinet positions). Meanwhile, Bush appointed two politicians associated with the right wing of his party (John Ashcroft and Donald Rumsfeld) A parallel in the context of the 2008 election is that Barack Obama was rumored to be considering two Republicans, Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar, for senior cabinet positions, in an attempt to win over voters from John McCain. Obama did not, however, come out and say that Hagel and Lugar were his top choices (although he was willing to say that they were possibilities, while at the same time widening the pool of possibilities to include even Arnold Schwarzenegger). 21 In response to questions from The Sunday Times regarding his choice of cabinet, he was coy in saying "Chuck Hagel is a great friend of mine. I have great respect for him."
22 Maybe we should not allow the candidates to escape with coyness and ask them for clarification. Allowing them to escape with such answers gives them greater discretion, after the election, to forget their implicit pre-election commitments to marginal voters and instead use the appointments to satisfy their core support groups.
The example of the George W. Bush cabinet appointments is interesting in that it stands in contrast to the example of Court appointments. In the Court context, the absence of a pre-election competition over naming names seems to result in relatively young and middle-of-the-road appointments. With the Bush cabinet appointments discussed above, we did not see the same dynamic. Rumsfeld and Ashcroft were anything but middle-of-the-road or uncontroversial. Nor were they particularly youthful. The different dynamic is due in part to the fact that cabinet members are not appointed for life, unlike Supreme Court members. Because cabinet members serve no longer than the President and are understood to be political, Senators have historically been more willing to confirm partisan cabinet members. It is hard to imagine any Supreme Court nominee openly averring that she was a partisan Democrat or Republican, whereas such partisanship is common for cabinet appointees.
The result is that the political dynamics surrounding Supreme Court and cabinet appointments diverge. But for both kinds of appointments, the pre-and post-election nomination considerations might be quite different. In each case, we should expect that pre-election choices would be different from Supreme Court and cabinet members chosen post-election. 
II. Why Answer?
The norm against naming names may seem natural, given that it has existed for many years. But it might not be that difficult to change. If we simply asked presidential nominees to tell us whom they would nominate for the Supreme Court and their cabinet before we voted for them, they might answer. The paradigm for our thinking about this Essay was the YouTube video questions asked of the candidates during the 2008 primary campaign. That process enabled individual citizens to ask the candidates direct questions, as they do in "town hall" meetings with candidates.
Why would a candidate answer such a question? The naysayers will explain that answering -naming specific names -would so constrain the presidential candidate and be so risky that no candidate will do it. Those answers are too simple.
The observation that candidates for political office prefer to make vague pronouncements rather than specific ones is not new. Scholars have posited explanations for the preference for obfuscation, grounded in the proposition that candidates have more to lose than to gain by being specific. 23 Our goal is not to take issue with those positive analyses of political behavior. Rather, it is to ask whether there are circumstances under which the presidential candidates might be willing (with inducement, if necessary) to be more specific. After all, candidates sometimes are willing to take risks, in an attempt to change the dynamics of a race they seem to be losing.
The circumstance we have in mind is where one candidate is significantly behind in the polls and can identify an important voting group with many members who are leaning toward his opponent (or toward staying home on election day) but are potentially movable. does not mean that a given name will actually sway anything close to 30% of voters. It is unlikely that a given name will move 5% or even 1% of the national electorate. But if selecting a particular person could move even half of one percent of the voters in a swing state, that would be a huge impact for a presidential candidate.
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The presidential election is winner-take-all. If one of the candidates is behind in the polls, he should be willing to take risks to get ahead. If he thinks he can potentially sway a segment of voters who would not otherwise vote for him, he might take the risk that he will offend others. Say that Obama is having difficulty getting the share of the women's vote that Democratic candidates usually get, and that he believes he needs to raise that percentage in order to win.
29 One way to get that share might be to pick a woman Vice President. But let us say that the women voters are skeptical and do not think that a Vice President has enough power to make a difference. Or it could be that Obama does not want a woman Vice President. The woman voters still need to be persuaded. And their skepticism means that they will need a credible signal rather than vague promises. 30 To solve this problem, Obama could announce that his top three picks for the Court are all women who share the values of Hillary Clinton supporters -or could announce that Hillary herself will be his next pick for the Court. If the Court and the issues it addresses, such as abortion, are voting issues for a number of women, then such an announcement might bring a nontrivial number of such voters into the Obama camp.
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/election_20082/2008_presidential_ election/for_republicans_judicial_appointments_matter_more_than_iraq.
In this regard, it is notable that campaigns often see an electoral advantage in attacking either close advisers who are presumed to be likely nominees or existing appointees in election campaigns. Henry Kissinger managed to be the focus of negative campaigning both by Ronald Reagan (in the Republican primaries and convention) and by Jimmy Carter (in the general election) in 1976. See Walter Isaacson, Rolling Out the Big Guns, TIME, Aug. 1, 1983, available at http://205.188.238.109/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921297,00.html (criticizing Ford by saying "Kissinger's stewardship of U.S. foreign policy has coincided precisely with the loss of U.S. military power"); Governor Jimmy Carter, Presidential Campaign Debate Between Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter (October 6, 1976) , available at http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/760854.htm) ("Mr. Ford, Mr. Kissinger have continued on with the policies and failures of Richard Nixon" and "as far as foreign policy goes, Mr. Kissinger has been the President of this country"). The point is that if candidates see that naming names is a way to win votes, they can be pushed to answer the question. And that will be truer of the candidate who is behind in the polls. The risk is not that different from many of the risks candidates take already. For example, running personally hostile ads might win over some voters but might alienate others. By moving the discussion of specific nominees to the pre-election context, we convert it into one of the weapons that the candidates are allowed (or forced, insofar as they are grilled by a questioner) to use in their competition.
When presidential candidates give names in advance, they constrain themselves. And the fewer names they give per position (we imagine they will proffer a single name per cabinet position, to give themselves the maximum benefit from naming particular people), the greater the constraint. That said, the President will ultimately choose just one person per position, so this is just moving the constraint forward in time. But beyond the differences discussed above about who will be chosen, naming names in advance does rule out one pre-election possibility that is not a meaningful choice once the election is concluded: the possibility of promising, or at least suggesting, the same job to more than one person. Pre-election, a presidential candidate can hint to multiple people that they will be his choice for Secretary of the Treasury.
31 Post-election, there can be only one choice. The presidential candidate will forego the option of (falsely) promising the same job to several people. But if the choice is between having foregone such a constraint and not being President versus having accepted this constraint but being President, we would expect candidates to choose the latter option.
How do we game this out? If the slates that each presidential candidate picked cancelled each other out (in terms of the votes netted by each slate), naming names would be a version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Both presidential candidates would be better off if neither named names in advance. That would keep their choosing power at its maximum. But the benefit of one defecting could be great to that one candidate (winning over swing voters). If both candidates disclosed, then they would (by hypothesis) be back to the status quo ante, so that neither candidate would have benefited himself and both would have reduced their power.
But the assumption of equal effect on voters seems unlikely: in all probability, the sets of names will not have the same effect, and the result will be that one candidate will gain support and the other will lose it. This could flow in part from the second discloser being perceived as simply 31 Some won't even need the hint in order to imagine themselves as possible nominees.
copying the other person and trying to play catch-up. Even assuming no first-mover advantage, it seems likely that one set of names would add more votes to candidate A than the other set of names would add to candidate B, because one set of names proves more persuasive to more key voters.
Thus, this would not be a Prisoner's Dilemma but instead simply another potential field of competition. What each candidate would gain is a better shot at the White House in a zero-sum game with his opponent. Offering the names of top appointees would become a new field of battle. Candidates would be competing to pick slates that would persuade voters in relevant voting groups.
Presidential candidates already engage in competition with respect to their choice of running mates. They choose Vice Presidents who will help bring particular segments of voters to their side, or at least soften the perception that a candidate is too extreme (e.g., Reagan choosing Bush), too moderate (e.g., Dole choosing Kemp), too old (e.g., Kemp again, and McCain choosing Palin), too callow (e.g., Kennedy choosing Johnson), etc. Presidential candidates have a number of voting groups they want to bring into their coalition, and they know that there is no vice-presidential choice who will resonate for all these groups. Announcing Supreme Court and cabinet choices in advance provides more opportunities for such balancing.
Beyond these narrow electoral considerations, there is a larger public-policy benefit to announcing nominees in advance: it allows the President-elect's key cabinet nominees to begin the transition process immediately after the November election. As matters stand, a President-elect names his key officers during the transition after the election, and the FBI then conducts its background checks (as it does on all nominees). The result is slow starts for each new Administration, as the President waits for his key people to be approved by the FBI and then the Senate before they can dive into their work. Two members of the 9/11 Commission argue that this current approach is "ineffective and dangerous" with respect to national security matters, where a smooth transition is crucial. 32 They contend that the FBI should conduct background checks on top nominees before the election. That way, immediately after the presidential election the nominees can start meeting with those they will succeed and getting up to speed on the many issues they will confront. This strikes us as right: a slow start-up for a new Administration can be costly and dangerous; naming nominees before the election will help the new Administration to get a running start. polls (not to mention smoothing the presidential transition), wouldn't we have seen the use of this strategy before? The point is a fair one. Candidates are advised by expert strategists who presumably have thought through every strategy and weighed costs and benefits. If the strategy has not been used, it is probably because is not a good one. We have two answers to the objection.
First, there have been relatively near misses and an analogue. In this election cycle Bill Richardson stated that "I would announce my Cabinet before the election. If I'm the nominee, I would tell you who my team would be."
33 Obviously, he is not the nominee and so he never got this chance, but he believed that it would be in his interest to reveal his team. And as noted above, it has been an open secret in some campaigns that a presidential candidate would nominate a specific person for a specific job.
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Beyond that, there is at least one instance from the past when a candidate did something akin to our proposal. In 1976, when Ronald Reagan was fighting Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination and needed to persuade the Republican moderates, he took the risky step of violating convention and naming his vice-presidential running mate prior to securing the nomination. 35 The naming of the vice-presidential candidate (Richard Schweiker), he hoped, would turn a number of the superdelegates in his direction. Reagan eventually lost, but the Schweiker strategy reportedly got him a lot closer than he would have been otherwise.
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The above examples are few and far between. Our second answer is that the benefits for the candidates themselves from such a strategy, even when they are far behind, probably do not outweigh the costs. The costs include not being able to promise patronage appointments after the election. Plus, the fact that these appointments were pre-approved by the electorate (and maybe instrumental in seeing the President in question elected) gives the appointees a level of independence that many presidential candidates will not want to cede. On their own, the candidates probably have other risks that they are more willing to take when they are behind in the polls. benefits are sufficiently close to the costs for candidates that we believe the norm can be changed. This is why our proposal has a chance of working only if we can devise some method of pushing the candidates to compete over names; perhaps by forcing them to tackle the question in a competitive public debate setting where they are under pressure to score points over their opponents.
III. Differences Between Pre-and Post-Election Nominees
If candidates did give names, how might pre-election nominees differ from post-election nominees? Are they likely to be more ideologically extreme? More likely to come from a swing state? More likely to represent a voting bloc? We begin with the area of greatest uncertainty (perceived position on the political spectrum) and then move to areas about which we think we can have some degree of confidence.
A. Ideology
The effect of pre-versus post-election announcement on ideology is least certain. Will a presidential candidate choose nominees who tend to be political moderates (perhaps even members of the opposite party)? Might a candidate instead lean toward candidates associated with the most ideological wing of their party? Relatedly, might a candidate choose a nominee associated with a powerful interest group, even if that group is unpopular with a substantial segment of voters? Because there are arguments on both sides, depending on how a presidential campaign plays out, these issues are difficult to predict.
The conventional wisdom of presidential campaigns is that candidates play to the base in the primaries and then move toward the middle in the general election. The candidates want to capture swing voters in the middle, so they emphasize how moderate they are. If this dynamic prevails for a given presidential candidate, then we might expect him to name moderate Supreme Court and cabinet nominees. He might even want to name one or more moderate members of the opposite party. Naming a Vice President from the opposing party entails significant risks (since that person would succeed the President if he died in office) and has been done only once in United States history, with what is widely regarded as a bad result (the presidency of Andrew Johnson). But there might be nontrivial benefits to Obama and/or Romney announcing that he will nominate one or more members of the opposite party as key cabinet members, or as a Supreme Court Justice.
That said, sometimes presidential campaigns prioritize energizing their bases. The main example is George W. Bush in 2004, whose electoral strategy focused on bringing out core supporters. If that is the case, then we might expect more ideological nominees.
Then there is the related possibility of appeasing an organized voter group. Depending on the central issues for such a voter, appealing to its members could push a candidate toward the middle of the voting populace or toward extremes. If, say, the Concord Coalition were able to motivate a large number of voters under a banner of fiscal responsibility, appeasing its members might appeal to a wide range of moderate voters. That said, the aims of most organized voter groups tend to be more ideologically skewed. These groups are generally organized to push a particular agenda that (they believe) is not adequately represented in the political mainstream. The ideology is part and parcel of their existence and appeal. In keeping with their origins, their ideology tends to be outside the political mainstream. Among the more significant of these groups, in terms of a history of mobilizing issue-based voters, are the National Rifle Association, trade unions, and conservative religious groups like Focus on the Family Action. Insofar as the candidates favored by these groups tend to play to each party's base (as we think is the case), naming such a candidate as a cabinet or Supreme Court choice would push the presidential candidate out of the mainstream, at least on the issue(s) that the mobilization group cared about. The presidential candidate's calculation, presumably, would be that many more members of the group would change their votes if their favored candidate were nominated for a post than would non-members of the group abandon the presidential candidate in disappointment. For example, it may be that John McCain would have gained more votes among conservative Christians by naming one or more of their choices as a Supreme Court pick than he would lose among the rest of the voting populace, if it turned out that many more conservative Christians vote based on the Supreme Court than other voters do.
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The problem with predictions about the ideological valence of a presidential candidate's choices is that there are many different ways a campaign can play out, and in some of them a candidate may believe he needs to shore up support among elements of his core supporters or votermobilization groups outside the political center, and in others he may 37 Announcing nominees pre-election could give leverage to politically cohesive minorities -including issue-based groups as well as racial and ethnic minorities who might want to use their votes to have narrow concerns addressed. Given that minority groups are typically not large enough to sway an election through their votes, most minority groups have to throw their support behind presidential candidates who are promising vague support to a variety of groups. These candidates, once elected, may not deliver. If, however, the candidates were to compete on naming potential nominees for posts that these minority groups cared specifically about, this would be a method by which minority groups could concentrate the effect of their votes. Pre-election, these groups would be able to compare the names from the two presidential candidates to see which one would better match their views on the issues of importance to them. believe that he needs to appeal to moderates in the middle. Does that mean that we cannot say anything about a presidential candidate's likely choices? On the contrary, we can say with some confidence that naming names before an election will tend to favor appointees from swing states and appointees with significant followings, and will strongly disfavor appointees whose main claim to fame is that they are confidants of the presidential candidate.
B. Swing States
Because of the Electoral College, presidential elections are a simultaneous set of state elections. And some states loom large -the swing states that, collectively, determine the outcome. In 2004, the key states were Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Political analysts correctly predicted that whoever won two of those three states would win the election. In 2000, the same three states were crucial. The identity of the key swing states could be different in 2008, but the number of such key states will still be small.
Candidates know this. The obvious strategy for a candidate is to appeal to the voters in an important state by naming appointees who will particularly appeal to voters from that state. A Democrat might promise to make Ohio's popular governor, Ted Strickland, his Secretary of the Treasury, and a Republican might make the same promise for equally popular Governor Charlie Crist of Florida. Or maybe a presidential candidate would pick a person from a swing state with more obvious credentials for the job (say, a sitting state Supreme Court Justice as a Supreme Court nominee), as a way of showing a commitment to quality while also choosing a favorite son or daughter.
There is a cost to this strategy -in the form of voters in other states who feel slighted because their governor (or whomever) was not selected. But the point about swing states is that only a relatively small number of states are likely to be significant, in terms of the Electoral College. Some voters in Utah might be upset if Romney or Obama announced a Missourian as Attorney General. But any defections in Utah will almost assuredly have no effect on Utah's likelihood of voting Republican. Given the benefits of gaining even .5% of the voters in a swing state by promising a job to a favored politician, such a strategy may make sense. If this happened it would be a return to an earlier model: for most of the history of the United States, Supreme Court and cabinet choices were understood to reflect regional and state-based balancing. There was a perceived Southern seat on the Court, for instance (along with the more recent "Jewish seat" and the still more recent "Woman's seat"). And it was widely understood that, just as a Vice President was chosen for regional balance, so too were cabinet members. Further, it was often understood that particular powerful states -Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania prominent among them -needed to have representation in the cabinet.
C. Those with a Following Versus Confidants
Similarly predictable are two other phenomena that are related to each other: presidential candidates will tend to choose people who have some significant political support on their own, and they will not choose people whose sole claim to fame is their relationship with the candidate.
The point of a campaign is to gain votes, and the safest way to do that is to select appointees who are popular with voters. That should lead presidential candidates to choose appointees who are political figures in their own right with a substantial number of supporters and a much smaller number of detractors. The goal is to find appointees who will have the maximum appeal, and that is likely to be people with strong and positive reputations.
It is possible that in some situations these considerations will lead a candidate to name appointees who are regarded for their ability and judgment but are not widely known among the electorate. Their following would be created by the positive responses of the commentariat to their selection. An example in this regard is President Ford's decision to nominate Edward Levi, who was Dean of the Chicago Law School and President of the University of Chicago before being chosen as the Attorney General. Ford's decision was praised by politicians and commentators who saw Levi as a break from the perceived cronyism and corruption of the Nixon Administration.
39 So even though Levi was not a major political figure on his own, he became a political asset because of the reaction to him. A presidential candidate might similarly want to dispel any appearance of cronyism by choosing an appointee who had a sterling reputationespecially for the Supreme Court, where the public expects probity and wisdom.
This relates to the proposition about which we have the most confidence: a candidate will not choose appointees who have neither an existing following nor a sterling reputation, but instead are largely known as friends or confidants of the candidate. Such a person brings little value to the electoral equation, and brings costs insofar as she seems to have gained her job through cronyism. selection. Her stature was perceived to be purely a function of her relationship with him. In the pre-election context of a competition for votes, she would have added little. And the taint of cronyism would have cost him votes. 40 The same is true of Robert Kennedy. Just as it is hard to imagine candidate Bush naming Harriet Miers, it is hard to imagine candidate John Kennedy naming his brother as his selection for Attorney General.
D. Diversity and Minority Interests
If a candidate decides to announce nominees, he might sometimes choose more than one name. Return to the example of Obama seeking to persuade skeptical women voters and assuming that their concern rests largely with whether he will nominate a pro-choice woman to the Court. It might help assuage their concerns more if he asserted that not only was his most favored nominee for the Court a pro-choice woman, but so were three of his next four favorites. This would provide additional assurance to skeptical voters that even if the top choice were to not work out, there was still a high likelihood that a woman would be nominated. The broader point is that naming names could well have an impact on various forms of diversity, in particular for Court nominees. If a candidate names three or more potential Supreme Court nominees, almost assuredly not all three will be white males (although all three could conceivably be women). A candidate who names only one nominee, however, might well choose a white male.
IV. Objections
A. Legality 18 U.S.C. § 599 provides, in relevant part, "[w]hoever, being a candidate, directly or indirectly promises or pledges the appointment, or the use of his influence or support for the appointment of any person to any public or private position or employment, for the purpose of procuring support in his candidacy shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Does this statute prevent a candidate from announcing during the campaign whom he would nominate for cabinet or Supreme Court positions? 41 There is a textual ambiguity in the statute: the trigger for the statute is "procuring support in his candidacy." Is this trigger procuring support from the public for his candidacy, or instead procuring support from the potential nominee (or perhaps the potential nominee's associates) for his candidacy? As a matter of sentence construction, the answer is not clear. The best argument in favor of § 599's application to the announcement of proposed cabinet and Supreme Court members is 18 U.S.C. § 600, which specifically covers quid pro quo bribery. 42 Note, though, that § 600 applies to promises regarding "employment, position, compensation, contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress," so it may be that both sections 599 and 600 were focused on quid pro quo corruption, but § 600 is more focused on those involving acts of Congress. Beyond these textual considerations, the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 599 reveals that Congress targeted corruption in the form of candidates secretly auctioning government appointments in return for money and political patronage from corrupt interests. The fear was that a candidate would go "to the corrupt interests and tell them that he will be their agent and tool." 43 Cong. 368 (1971) (statement of Joseph Califano) ("Isn't the relationship between campaign contributions and ambassadorial posts a luxury beyond our national means in the crisis-prone world of the 1970's? Are not domestic issues sufficiently complex to require high level executive branch appointments on the basis of ability without regard to financial contributions?").
legislative history suggests that Congress had the remotest concerns about the sort of statements we are proposing, which would neither be based on money nor secret. It is hard to see how such announcements could be regarded as the sort of corruption at which Congress was aiming.
We do not dwell on these arguments regarding statutory interpretation because any attempt at applying this statute to a candidate's promises would violate the First Amendment. In Brown v. Hartlage, 44 the United States Supreme Court confronted a state statute very similar to § 599. 45 A candidate for County Commissioner had promised to lower Commissioners' salaries if elected, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that this violated the state statute because "when a candidate offers to discharge the duties of an elective office for less than the salary fixed by law, a salary which must be paid by taxation, he offers to reduce pro tanto the amount of taxes each individual taxpayer must pay, and thus makes an offer to the voter of pecuniary gain." 46 The Supreme Court reversed, unanimously. The Court treated this regulation of candidates' speech as subject to strict scrutiny (one in a long line of cases so finding), 47 and it invalidated this statute because it failed the first prong of a strict scrutiny inquiry -the identification of a compelling state interest. The Court noted that there was a plausible claim that a promise to accept a lower salary would reduce voters' taxes, but it found that the state's interest in preventing vote-buying was not implicated because "Brown did not offer some private payment or donation in exchange for voter support; Brown's statement can only be construed as an expression of his intention to exercise public power 44 456 U.S. 45 (1982) . 45 The statute at issue in Hartlage provided that: No candidate for nomination or election to any state, county, city or district office shall expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other thing of value, either directly or indirectly, to any person in consideration of the vote or financial or moral support of that person. No such candidate shall promise, agree or make a contract with any person to vote for or support any particular individual, thing or measure, in consideration for the vote or the financial or moral support of that person in any election, primary or nominating convention, and no person shall require that any candidate make such a promise, agreement or contract. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 121.055. 214, 218-219 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes."). [Vol. __:____ in a manner that he believed might be acceptable to some class of citizens." 48 As the Court emphatically stated, Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of government officials to the people whom they represent, and assist the voters in predicting the effect of their vote.
The fact that some voters may find their self-interest reflected in a candidate's commitment does not place that commitment beyond the reach of the First Amendment. We have never insisted that the franchise be exercised without taint of individual benefit; indeed, our tradition of political pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue their individual good through the political process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits will further the collective welfare. So long as the hoped-for personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal processes of government, and not through some private arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable basis upon which to cast one's ballot.
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In Hartlage, there was at least a plausible interest that the state could articulate (avoiding vote-buying), even though it was unpersuasive. It is difficult to see any legitimate (much less compelling) interest that the government would have in preventing corruption via prohibiting the naming of cabinet or Supreme Court nominees. Put differently, it is hard to fathom what the state's interest would be. In Hartlage, there was a benefit to voters in the form of reduced taxes, but here there is no benefit to voters other than the likely nomination of appointees whom they would like to see in positions of power -and there is no conceivable state interest in preventing that from happening.
The government might have an interest in prohibiting concealed promises from candidates to potential nominees. Secret promises give no information to voters, so their only benefit is a private one to the candidate and/or to the nominee. That underscores the implausibility of any government interest in preventing the public naming of nominees in advance. There simply is no corrupting element.
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Id. at 58.
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Id. at 55-56; see also id. at 60 ("In barring certain public statements with respect to this issue, the State ban runs directly contrary to the fundamental premises underlying the First Amendment as the guardian of our democracy. That Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad, and between candidates for political office. The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.").
A different way to come at this question is to consider why the First Amendment puts a high value on electioneering speech. One reason is because an active and full debate among candidates helps voters make more informed choices. The voters are the customers choosing among products in the marketplace of ideas. Reading the statute to prohibit the public disclosure of prospective nominees results in the implicit (and sometimes explicit) bargains between presidential candidates and prospective nominees being pushed underground. And that in turn prevents voters from being able to evaluate the competing bargains that the different candidates have struck -the reverse of what First Amendment values push toward. In effect, this occurred with Earl Warren's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1953. Dwight Eisenhower reportedly promised Earl Warren that he would be appointed to the Court as soon as a seat opened up. 50 The public though, had no way of factoring this promise into their decision as to whether to vote for Ike or not.
It is simply impossible to imagine any compelling interest for the application of § 599 to our proposal, much less a compelling interest to which application of § 599 would be narrowly tailored. And it bears noting that in the years since Hartlage, the Court has, if anything, raised the First Amendment bar for regulations on campaign speech (holding, for instance, that a prohibition on candidates for judicial office "'announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues'" violates the First Amendment, despite the obvious state interest in avoiding the appearance of impartiality) 51 . The bottom line, then, is that application of § 599 to our proposal would run afoul of the First Amendment, and the matter seems so clear that the weight of expert opinion would so conclude.
The clarity of this unconstitutionality is important, because we could imagine a candidate's staff concluding that a seeming prohibition on some planned activity would not apply, but also that reasonable minds could differ as to legality, so that the candidate should not engage in that activity. Section 599 is not one of those cases, because there is no plausible argument that its application to a presidential candidate is consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence. Just as the majority of economists said that a summer "gas tax holiday" would be a bad idea, so too the majority of legal scholars would conclude that application of § 599 to the naming of cabinet or Supreme Court members would be unconstitutional. It bears noting that the revelation of the economists' views on the gas tax holiday coincided with a shift in polls on the issue -early support by a majority of those polled gave way to majority opposition once the economists' views became known.
52
Perhaps that explains why § 599 has never been the subject of a single case, and why it has come up so rarely: those who might raise the issue know that they are subject not only to the objection that they are being legalistic and litigious, but also that their legal arguments fail on their own terms because the statute is so obviously unconstitutional. In the public's eye, one of the few things worse than a narrow, legalistic claim is a narrow, legalistic claim that, according to experts, is flatly wrong because it is unconstitutional.
B. Too Much Like an Election
In effect, we are pushing toward more direct democracy. The large literature on the evils of judicial elections suggests that moving toward something akin to the election of Justices on the Court is crazy.
53 But, if unpacked, the objection to the election of judges is not that elections are bad. Instead, the objection is primarily to uninformed voters. 54 That is, that the electorate has little incentive to obtain the information necessary to make good choices, so the result is more farce than anything resembling an election. The typical critique of elections involves invoking some story of an election in which some unqualified candidate won simply because he had a catchy name or that his name resembled that of someone famous. 55 But, even conceding that voters are not adequately informed when it comes to local and state elections, surely they will have more information when we are talking about a Supreme Court Justice or a top cabinet position. If anything, because the candidates are competing for voters, the supporters of the different potential nominees will compete to provide more information about their favorite nominees, in the hope that the candidates will pick them. Lack of information about the nominees is unlikely to be the problem. Id.
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A different concern is that voters will be interested only in one issue, such as abortion and (for a Supreme Court Justice) thus whether Roe v. Wade will be overturned. Given the voting public's focus on a limited set of oversimplified issues, one might fear that the naming of a potential nominee to the Court would simply result in voters asking whether this nominee would vote in favor of upholding Roe or not. We do not see why it would be a terrible thing if voters had better information as to whether a presidential candidate would A related objection is that cabinet members or Court appointees whose names were announced pre-election might see themselves as having received a mandate from the voters, independent of the President. They may, in other words, have their own agendas. An example here is yet another recent historical analogue -George W. Bush's broad hints that he would name Colin Powell as his Secretary of State. 57 One could argue that this pre-election anointing led Powell to see himself as having an independent connection to the voters and thus led him to fail to toe the Bush Administration's line. One commentator put this forward as a reason why pre-election announcements are unwise, suggesting that such announcements will lead to greater independence on the part of cabinet members.
58 Of course, whether this is desirable or not is hotly contested. This implicates one of the central questions regarding the structure of the federal government: How much control should a President have over those who serve in his administration? There are no easy answers to this question, as an increase in presidential control will strike some as beneficial and others as harmful. But it bears noting that, in any event, the President would still have the same legal authority -including the ability to fire those in his cabinet.
The Supreme Court bears particular emphasis on this question of independence. Most people, we suspect, would embrace independence in a Supreme Court Justice. And with good reason: if Justices simply mirror the views of the President who appoints them, then they are acting as a small, unrepresentative group of life-tenured super-legislators -and it is far from clear why we should embrace that state of affairs. 59 appoint Justices who would overturn or affirm Roe. As a general principle, we should prefer voting that is better informed. The fear, though, is that better informed voting about a single issue will do more harm than good. But persuadable voters will care about a range of issues that they believe the Supreme Court may decide -Roe, Ten Commandments displays, the Second Amendment, etc. -not just one single issue. The hot-button issues that interest voters do not, of course, encompass the range of cases that the Supreme Court decides. But that is already the case: with respect to Supreme Court nominees, not only the public but also interest groups and Senators focus on a few hot-button issues. And the advantage of our proposal is that voters get much more information about presidential candidates and their administration's policies before they cast their votes. Books can be -and have been -written on this subject, and we will not dwell on it here. But the overwhelming weight of the commentary is that it would be undesirable to have a Court whose members simply voted as the President who appointed them would. The larger point is that the competition for votes is what matters. If presidential candidates think that voters prefer to elect a President with advisers and Court appointees who are beholden to him, then let us force them to take that position. And maybe we will have a competition where the presidential candidates adopt different strategies. One would disclose his prospective cabinet and Court nominees and the other would not. The voters would be better informed as to what type of President they were voting for.
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C. Too Much Pressure and Scrutiny on the Nominees
A third objection has to do with the scrutiny of the nominees. Arguably, there is a greater incentive for political opponents to find damaging information about a nominee before the election, for the simple reason that such information could help to change the outcome of the election. Torpedoing an elected President's nominee has some benefits for the opposition (tarnishing the President, perhaps getting a replacement nominee more to the opposition's liking), but the President still gets to choose the failed nominee's replacement. But damaging a nominee preelection might have a much greater payoff, because it might sufficiently hurt the candidate (likely distracting the candidate from his message, and perhaps making him seem like a poor judge of character) to cause him to lose the election. After all, we are positing that the naming of a nominee could swing the election in a candidate's favor. If that's so, then maybe the tarnishing of the nominee could swing the election back toward the candidate's opponent. And in light of the incentives to find dirt on the pre-election nominees, wouldn't the scrutiny be too severe? Maybe it would be so severe that it would dissuade the best nominees? And surely, it would be awfully uncomfortable for a sitting judge -on a state or lower federal court -to be the topic of debate during a presidential election? 60 What about the danger that having to name names in advance might unduly constrain the President's ability to adjust to changed circumstances? After all, in the period between the presidential election and when a seat on the Supreme Court opens up, circumstances can change. Those changed circumstances can, in turn, alter presidential preferences regarding appointments to the Court.
The point is a fair one. Having named names in advance, the President would not be able to alter names as easily as he would have been able to do otherwise. But that is not necessarily a bad thing. If changed circumstances required a deviation from the previously named names, the President would have to explain, with specific reasons, why the new name was better in the context of those changed circumstances. For example, say that it is three years since the presidential election before a seat opens up on the Court. In that period, a new star has emerged in the ranks of the state court judiciary -one who is considered fair minded and insightful and whose opinions are the most cited of any state court judge in the country. For the President to name this person over the previously named individual, he would have to provide a credible and detailed explanation for the new candidate was better than the prior one. Vague statements about how "this is the most qualified individual" would not suffice. The end result would be greater transparency.
The potential benefits to a candidate's opponents of attacks on a candidate's nominees are greater pre-election than post-election. But so are the potential costs. If, say, Romney announced nominees who were subjected to attacks that the public perceived as unfair, the public would likely attribute the unfairness to Obama. Obama probably would not persuade many people if he tried to say that the attacks were independent of him -people would likely believe that his people were involved in it, just as voters believed that George H.W. Bush was involved in the Willie Horton ad in 1988. Indeed, if Obama tries to distance himself from attacks on Romney's nominees, voters may see that as him trying to weasel out of responsibility. In other words, in the crucible of an election, when the battle between two opposing ideologies are personified in a race between two individuals, the benefits and costs of everything relating to the campaign are received and borne by those two individuals.
It still may be that campaigns decide that a particular attack will win over more persuadable voters than it will deter. That is the only cost and benefit that matter to a campaign -increasing your vote count and/or decreasing your opponent's. One can imagine many different attacks, and some percentage of them will win more votes than they will lose. But it is difficult even for political professionals to figure out in advance which attacks will work and which will not, and sometimes they blow up in the face of those peddling the information. In 2004 vice-presidential candidate John Edwards pointedly noted that Dick Cheney's daughter is a lesbian, obviously hoping to score political points. But the reaction to his statement was so negative that it likely was counterproductive from Edwards' perspective.
Indeed, the scrutiny for those named before the election could be less than it would be after the election, and perhaps better, from the candidate's and the populace's perspective. There are a couple of reasons why this might be the case. First, during an election, given that there are numerous other issues to be debated as well, maybe the scrutiny would be lower. Further, the larger the number of names announced, the lower the attention paid to any one of those names is likely to be. Second, think about the type of scrutiny that might be applied before an election versus after. After the election, the President has control of the choice. Scrutiny therefore tends to be largely of the muckraking variety -looking to see whether the nominee rented dirty videos or joined some inappropriate student group while in college. That makes sense, since the only game being played is the one in which one can unearth enough dirt to tank the nominee. If the game is moved to before the election, the scrutiny might be in terms of which presidential candidate has the better proposed nominees. In other words, it might be scrutiny of the useful and positive variety. Some of the proposed nominees might still come out looking worse for the wear. But those potential nominees, if given the choice, may prefer scrutiny before the election over scrutiny after.
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A particular incentive for potential nominees is that there may be a kind of estoppel effect. A candidate whose name was put forward before the election and whose candidate won could make two related arguments. First, my candidate won after releasing my name, so the voters effectively ratified my selection. Second, you had a chance to make your objections before the election and you failed to do so persuasively, so now it is unfair for you to bring forward new arguments, or even to oppose me.
One might still imagine that potential nominees will not want to be named in advance, because they will know that the scrutiny may be for naught. After all, the most obvious difference between pre-and postelection nomination is that the scrutiny after the election is only for those who are chosen, whereas the scrutiny before the election is for two sets of nominees (one for each major party presidential candidate, assuming that both decide to name their nominees). So one set of names will be subject to this scrutiny and then still not be chosen, because their candidate lost the election. In addition, if a presidential candidate names, say, three possible choices for each given cabinet position, then not only would the losing candidate's choices be subject to scrutiny without obtaining the cabinet position, but so would two-thirds of the winning candidate's named choices. This last point is a reason why a presidential candidate might well choose to name a single person for each cabinet position. After all, the biggest likely payoff for undecided and skeptical voters arises if they know that their favored candidate will be Secretary of X, rather than knowing that their favored candidate is one of three possibilities.
But let us return to the nominees of the presidential candidate who loses. What difference will this make? It will disappoint those who are named by presidential candidates who lose the election. But will it make enough of a difference to persuade anyone to remove her name from consideration by a presidential candidate? We doubt that it would, for a few reasons. First, there is distinction in being chosen by a candidate. Everyone would prefer to be the Secretary of the Treasury rather than simply to be proffered as the Secretary if one's presidential candidate wins. The question is which of the following would be a person's second choice: 1) to have been named by a major party presidential candidate as the Secretary he 61 Relatedly, since expected scrutiny and expected penalty go hand in hand in making strategic choices during an election, it may be that the penalty for naming a person who turns out to have a sordid past might not be as large in the pre-election context. Perhaps, in the preelection context, because the public will know that the candidate had less time to evaluate the potential nominees, the penalty will be lower. We concede, however, that it may be that the first time or two a presidential candidate names names, the public will expect lots of vetting (because of the boldness of trying something new).
would choose but have one's candidate lose; 2) to have never been named at all, but to believe (along with at least several others) that one would have been chosen by the presidential nominee had he been elected, but never to find out because that candidate lost. Most would likely choose the first option, because with the first option the potential candidate has been identified as such and thus received a fair amount of fame and press attention. There is an analogy to the position of running mate. Bob Dole would have preferred that he and President Ford had been elected in 1976. But merely being on the ticket helped his political fortunes, pushing him to a greater level of prominence than he would have achieved if he had not been chosen as Vice President. The same is true for Joe Lieberman, Jack Kemp, Geraldine Ferraro, and most every other losing vice-presidential candidate.
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That said, neither the presidential candidate nor his announced choices will be happy if the candidate puts forward a name with skeletons in the closet. Lots of aspects of one's personal life (e.g., whether you have sex with prostitutes, or solicit sex in men's bathrooms) are considered fair game, and presidential candidates are going to avoid people about whom there might be embarrassing revelations. This will lead to a preference for preelection nominees who can credibly claim to be squeaky clean.
One way to achieve this is for the potential nominee or the campaign to hire an independent investigative firm to check her background. But the more obvious solution is for the FBI to perform background checks. The FBI performs such checks for all nominees, and this would just move up the time for a few of those checks. 63 As noted above, pre-election FBI background checks would have the added advantage of having the new President's team up and running as soon as possible after the election.
Beyond that, a potential nominee could credibly claim to be squeaky clean based on a different sort of background check -the scrutiny that comes from running for office or holding other important political positions. Someone who has recently run for office can point out that her background was extensively researched by political opponents and the press, and that they found nothing. So, insofar as private or FBI vetting is unattractive, pre- Presidential candidates would not need to worry about a hostile Administration getting information from the FBI. Such a leak would be a remarkable breach of protocol. If information about an FBI background check were released to the public in advance of an announcement, the presidential candidate would (fairly) express his outrage at the Administration's violation of the FBI's processes. And the charge would likely be effectivepeople do not like the idea of the FBI playing politics. The hostile Administration could try to remove its fingerprints from the leak. But, as with the release of unfair attacks, people will attribute the attacks to the party that benefits, and will associate that party (naturally enough) with the party's presidential candidate. election selection will tend to favor existing politicians for vetting reasons. And, again, pre-election selection will favor existing politicians for another reason -presidential candidates will want to name people with a significant following (in the hope that they are sufficiently popular to bring some persuadable voters to vote for the presidential candidate), and people with such a following will tend to be existing politicians who, not coincidentally, have already been subject to much scrutiny.
One issue lingers: with respect to Supreme Court nominees, the issue about sitting judges being caused discomfort is a fair one. Maybe these judges would find it difficult to make decisions fairly while under such scrutiny? We are skeptical. At the outset, we note that it might not be so horrible if Presidents chose Supreme Court Justices from outside the pool of sitting judges. Sitting lower court judges do bring with them the experience of having been judges. But the Supreme Court is a different entity than the lower courts. As noted above, some commentators believe that we would be better served by Justices who are drawn from beyond the judiciary. 64 There would be costs to not being able to draw from the pool of lower court judges, but possible benefits too.
The more important point is that if lower court judges did feel discomfort -as they probably should in politically sensitive cases in the period of time after their names have been announced by one or the other presidential candidate -they could recuse themselves from those politically hot cases. Given that there is already perceived to be a problem with some lower court judges auditioning for the Supreme Court via their opinions, it might be good to eliminate that auditioning by naming names and inducing recusals. Currently, it is possibly the case that a dozen or so appeals court judges who are shaping their opinions with a view to the fact that some presidential candidate's advisers are going to be scrutinizing those opinions for the right kinds of attitudes. Naming names in advance should ameliorate that problem. It will reduce the number of judges auditioning and also allow (if not force) the chosen ones to recuse themselves from some cases, or to take a leave of absence, to avoid the appearance of political favoritism. That transparency seems preferable to the opacity of a bunch of judges trying to outdo each other in currying favor with a new President.
D. Too Much Distraction from the Key Issues About the Candidates Themselves
Would forcing candidates to think hard about whom specifically they might want on the Supreme Court (or as their Secretary of Defense or Treasury) before the election force them to turn their attention away from important campaign or policy questions? The answer depends on what a
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See supra text accompanying notes ___ to ___. discussion of nominees would displace. One only has to look at the sorts of issues that the media choose to focus on -and therefore that the candidates have to focus on -in campaigns. Some give us useful information about a President's likely performance and policies (e.g., who has the better healthcare plan), but such discussions are often overwhelmed by endless rehashings of supposed gaffes or other ephemera. A presidential candidate's naming of possible cabinet or Supreme Court appointees would produce at least some discussion about whether the named people would be good choices and what this reveals about the likely policies of the President's administration, which with any luck would be more illuminating about the President's likely policies and performance in office than whatever it would crowd out. Given our current financial situation, wouldn't it be worthwhile to have the candidates compete on who would appoint a better Secretary of Treasury? Or, given the situation in Iraq, maybe we could benefit from a competition over who the Secretaries of Defense and State would be?
Our proposal does push the electoral considerations slightly toward a focus on a presidential candidate's team. But, given the importance of cabinet members and Supreme Court Justices, such a move seems appropriate. And, significantly, the media and voters already pay a lot of attention to people who are perceived as reflecting on the presidential candidate's judgment -in this election cycle preachers have loomed large, and to a lesser extent the tactics and lobbying ties of top campaign officials. This highlights that voters are often interested in the people around a President. Even casual sports fans usually know something about more than one player on a given team, so it is not surprising that voters have some interest in a presidential candidate's team. 65 As long as the media and voters are going to be interested in people who seem to reflect on a candidate, it will be in a candidate's interest -and, we think, society's interest -for at least some of that focus to shift toward the people who will be making important decisions, and cabinet officials and Supreme Court Justices will be at the top of that list.
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As a comparative matter, the average voter will likely know far more about the starting players on their favorite team than they will know about any of the people on a candidate's team (and maybe the candidate himself), but as an absolute matter many voters will still have interest in a presidential candidate's team.
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What if McCain had said that the economy was in shambles and that he was going to ask Robert Rubin and Larry Summers to come back to run things on the financial front? Maybe Obama would have countered with someone better. Or maybe he would have said that he also would ask Rubin and Summers. That way -assuming the electorate agreed that the Rubin-Summers combination would be optimal -we might have had effective financial policy regardless of who was elected. One can spin out a similar story for the Supreme Court. If the candidates were to compete and there was a clearly optimal nonpartisan solution that the populace preferred -maybe a modern version of Learned Hand or Henry Friendly (neither of whom ever got on to the High Court) -we might even get a situation where the candidates would end up being forced to agree on the same candidate. The candidates would not like this because it would reduce their ability to pay back political favors. But the electorate would be better off.
We recognize the argument that the presidential race should be about the candidate's character and his family values and his spouse's family values and so on. Our proposal would distract from that -for which we make no apologies.
E. Reducing the Incentives to Work on the Candidates' Campaigns
The factual claim underlying this argument is that many of those who work on presidential campaigns or contribute money do so in the hope of being rewarded with positions in the administration. The competition among these campaigners is most intense for the most prestigious positions, such as judgeships, cabinet positions and ambassadorships. Sometimes, the person doing the campaigning is not seeking the appointment for herself, but wants input into whom the President selects. The incentive effects on behavior are the same, though. There is a tournament of sorts among supporters, with those who do the most being rewarded with appointments or the power to influence appointments. If candidates are forced to name names in the pre-election context, this will reduce the incentives for supporters to work hard since they will now know which of them will be receiving positions and which won't be.
We have no quarrel with the foregoing; it strikes us as an accurate portrayal of incentives. Yes, there will be fewer incentives to work hard on a campaign for those who are hoping to leverage their work into an appointment. And that will make it more difficult for the candidates to run their campaigns. Maybe candidates will end up having to work harder on fundraising. But is there is a net social loss? Reducing the ability of the candidates to use the prospect of future appointments as a carrot to induce effort from campaign staff increases social value in that having fewer patronage-based appointments should result in better-quality appointments overall.
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Conclusion: Worth Moving Beyond the Status Quo?
In light of the above and dozens of other objections that we haven't anticipated, would it be a good idea for the rules of the presidential election 67 A related objection is that the election process, where various contenders for appointments compete to show the presidential candidate which of them is more loyal and capable (e.g., by demonstrating good or bad judgment in what they say to the press), supplies useful information to presidential candidates. But characteristics like loyalty and judgment will likely have been demonstrated for months (if not years) before, and any additional seeming increment of those characteristics shown during the campaign may not reveal accurate information. Anyone can put on a good show for a couple of months, if the incentive is a top spot in a new Administration. game to be changed? To no longer allow candidates to get away with giving vague answers about who their nominees for cabinet and Court positions will be? The candidates might refuse to answer the questions. Or there might be large-scale capture by interest groups. There is a potential downside. We believe, however, that the odds are in our favor that inducing greater competition over the names of prospective nominees will yield improvement over the status quo.
The source of the gains is from forcing information out of the candidates. Voters would have more information in two ways. First, the public would know who key members of an Administration would be. The public could evaluate the President's choices, rather than guess about them based on reports of whom the President seemed to favor or who worked tirelessly on his campaign. Second, the identity of those nominees would provide information about the other people that the President might appoint, and more generally about the sorts of policies that the President might pursue. Naming names is a costly signal -and costly signals yield more information than does cheap talk. This information will be particularly valuable for presidential candidates whose prior public careers have been fairly short -which describes a good percentage of recent Presidents.
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More broadly, the choices made would give us important information about the potential President. Is he willing to take risks, by nominating potentially controversial candidates? Does he choose people with lots of government experience, or outsiders? Does he seem more comfortable with people of a certain temperament?
And while we have nothing against discussions of the trivial -we like gossip as much as anyone -maybe it wouldn't justify as much space on the front pages of national dailies. In each of the last two presidential races the New York Times saw fit to devote front-page space to an article about the person who carries the Democratic nominee's snacks. 69 These gentlemen seem like nice people, 70 but do we gain insight into the likely policies of a President Kerry by learning that he likes peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, or the policies of a President Obama by finding out that he likes Met-Rx protein bars? More useful would be profiles of the people he was actually going to choose for policy positions. Such profiles are not terribly useful 68 Eisenhower had no previous experience as an elected official; Kennedy had a fairly short legislative career prior to his Presidency; Carter had a single term as Governor of Georgia; George W. Bush had a term and a half as Governor of Texas. One of the authors has met both and can attest that they seem quite likable. when many names are bandied about -these discussions have at most a snippet about each of the people who might be a prominent cabinet member or a Supreme Court Justice. And the discussions often spend a fair amount of time to speculation about whose star might be ascendant and whose is falling. Such guesswork can make for a parlor game, but its value is limited. If, by contrast, we had actual names, then we could learn more about them, and as a result learn about the policies that the administration would likely pursue.
Ultimately, the desirability of a competition over names is in the eye of the beholder. But note a broader dispositional factor that looms large: one's attitude toward change. For those wary of change, our proposal will be anathema. For those sympathetic to it, it may be welcome. It likely comes down to your sympathy to Edmund Burke versus your sympathy for a quotation made famous by Ronald Reagan -"Status quo, you know, is Latin for 'the mess we're in. '" 71 71 See http://www.answers.com/topic/status-quo.
